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This article argues that the introduction of the Hebrew words for judge and justice, 
which occurs only late in the text of Genesis is not fortuitous. Abraham introduces 
these terms in the context of his argument with God that He spare Sodom and Go-
morrah if a number of righteous men can be found there. This happens long after 
the invention of human arts and institutions including the city and the execution 
by God of several notable and severe judgments against individuals and indeed all 
the living world. The words shopheṭ and mishpaṭ, one proposes, adumbrates a new 
and different kind of justice than what existed before one based on equality under 
law and on a procedure of advocacy and argument rather than mere Divine fiat. 
Since God accepts unquestioningly Abraham’s unprecedented definition of Him as 
“Judge of the world,” one might further suggest that the Master of the Universe in 
the course of the evolving covenantal relationship with mankind is allowing His 
creatures to discover aspects of Him that were hitherto unknown to them and un-
knowable till they developed further. In both its character and the sequence of the 
events that unfold, the Biblical narrative is in some respects closely parallel to the 
myth of human genesis and cultural development, followed by the introduction of 
justice, in the Protagoras of Plato. Since the latter myth is connected to the progeny 
of Iapetos, who may be identical with Biblical Japheth, it is possible that the two nar-
ratives, Hebrew and Hellenic, may share common, possibly Semitic, roots.
Keywords: Abraham, Moses, shopheṭ, mishpaṭ, theodicy, Marina Tsvetaeva, Zoroas-
trianism, Mi‘raj, the Berdichever Rebbe, Plato, Protagoras, Athens.
When God informs Abraham that He is about to obliterate the Cities of the 
Plain, the Patriarch retorts, Ha-shopheṭ kol ha-arets lo ya‘aseh mishpaṭ, “Will the 
judge of all the earth not do justice?” (Gen. 18.25), God agrees to relent if fifty 
righteous people can be found there; our forefather argues Him down to ten, but 
is still unsuccessful. Rashi notes that Abraham seeks mishpaṭ emet, “true jus-
tice”1, and notes that in the days of Noah only eight righteous people were in the 
1 Justice “in truth” would distinguish God’s bench from kangaroo courts and Star Chamber 



















world ve-lo hitsilu ‘al doram, “and they did not save their generation”. The situa-
tion did not improve since then: there were not enough just men in the cities of 
Sodom and Gomorrah to save the proverbially corrupt cities from destruction. 
Evidently the Divine bottom line was established then to endure as the mini-
mum of ten adult Jewish men needed for the prayer minyan — the quorum. The 
number needed to save the whole world was relaxed, though: a mystical Jewish 
belief that became particularly well-known after the Holocaust with the publica-
tion of a novel by André Schwarz-Bart, The Last of the Just, holds that the world 
endures only because there are thirty-six just men alive in it at any one time — 
the lamedvovniks. The contention of the novel is that the last of these righteous 
ones was murdered in Hitler’s death camps. Nothing holds back, or should hold 
back, the sword of the Angel of Death from the human world. It is an invitation 
to oblivion, a suicidal ideation. Even before the war, as the Nazis overwhelmed 
Czechoslovakia, Marina Tsvetaeva had given voice to a similarly despairing con-
demnation of the fallen world: “О слезы на глазах! / Плач гнева и любви! / О 
Чехия в слезах! / Испания в крови! // О черная гора, / Затмившая — весь 
свет! / Пора — пора — пора / Творцу вернуть билет. // Отказываюсь — 
быть. / В Бедламе нелюдей / Отказываюсь — жить. // С волками площадей 
//  Отказываюсь  — выть. /  С акулами равнин /  Отказываюсь плыть  — 
/ Вниз — по теченью спин. // Не надо мне ни дыр / Ушных, ни вещих глаз. 
/ На твой безумный мир / Ответ один — отказ”. “O tears in my eyes, / Crying 
anger, crying love! / The Czech lands all in tears, / And Spain all drenched in 
blood! // Mountain of darkness / Eclipsing this luminous world — /  It’s time, 
it’s long past time, / To return the entry pass to God. // I refuse to thrive, / In 
this madhouse of unhumans / I decline to survive. // I refuse to howl / With the 
wolves of the public squares, / And with the sharks of the plains / I refuse to swim 
/ With their current, down. / I need no ears to hear, / Nor knowing eyes: / To 
Your insane world / Refusal is the sole reply”. She returned to the Soviet Union 
from emigration, there to enjoy the malign hospitality of the state bureaucracy, 
and handed in her ticket: Tsvetaeva committed suicide in 1942. With Abraham’s 
challenge, Justice — Hebrew mishpaṭ, Greek dikē — formally entered the world; 
but since then the injustice of mankind, the abominable suffering to which flesh 
is heir, and the silence of Heaven — the seeming absence of God’s justice, theo-
justice in the Hebrew Bible and in Jewish tradition // Journal of Law and Religion. 2011–2012. 
Vol. 27, no. 2. P. 308) notes, citing b. Sanhedrin 7a, that every judge who judges a true judgment 
causes the Divine Presence (Shekhinah) to rest in Israel; in b. Berakhot 6a (on Ps. 82:1) God is 
likewise understood as sitting with the judges through His Shekhinah (ibid., p. 295). This would 
resonate with the Christian identification of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity as the Paraclete — one’s 
defense attorney in court (with Satan retaining his office, most visibly evoked in the book of 
Job, as diabolos). A Yiddish saying, Es iz a kulikover mishpaṭ “It’s a Kulikov trial!” enshrines the 
proverbial opposite of true justice, a miscarriage careening wildly into absurdity indeed. Kulikov, 
a little town near L’vov, had one shoemaker and two tailors. The shoemaker committed murder, 
and was tried and sentenced to hang, but since he was the only shoemaker in town one of the 
tailors was hanged instead (Kumove S. Words Like Arrows: A Collection of Yiddish Folk Sayings. 



















dicy — has provoked many of us to turn in our own tickets and leave life’s stage 
before the countdown to cataclysm ends: thirty-six, ten, zero.
Abraham employs a particular root in his tautly sarcastic challenge to the 
Almighty, and it is precisely here that it, špṭ-, makes its own entry into a prom-
inent career throughout the remainder of Scripture and into Jewish and world 
history. The verb and its nominal derivates no problem in the oldest Semitic: 
Ugaritic tpṯ “judge, rule” (an epithet of Yamm); Akkadian šapātu. Closer to the 
home of Biblical Israel the usage is well-nigh identical: Punic š-p-t means “ad-
judge” in the expression špṭ brḥ “adjudge the intent (of someone)” or “condemn” 
and is used in monitory formulas warning thieves of steles of divine judgment. 
The noun špṭ, loaned into Latin as su(f)fes, pl. su(f)fetes, is “the civil magistrate 
of a Western Phoenician republic”. As a plural it corresponds to the Hebrew 
shophetim, Judges (both the office, parallel to the Phoenician institution, and of 
course the Biblical book)2. The Hebrew title, like the Punic one, can have more 
to do with a ruler than specifically a magistrate: one of the Judges in the Hebrew 
Bible, Samson, is an epic hero, unremarkable in a Hellenic context, but atypical 
in Israel. He has an Apollonian-like solar name, engages in Heraclean combat 
with a lion, sulks in a cave when his strength is sapped, and, Oedipus-like, comes 
ironically to true insight only after his physical eyes have been put out. But one 
imagines that in a Sanhedrin, not to mention any later beth din, Rabbinical court, 
the shaggy warrior would stick out like the proverbial sore thumb. Genesis is, as 
its geography and other features indicate, historically a late book. One might for 
instance argue that the seven-day Creation, with each creation deemed “good” 
till man, who is “very good”, bears the imprint of the Zoroastrian cosmology, 
in which each of the seven Amesha Spentas, or Holy Immortal hypostases of 
the Creator God Ahura Mazda, the Wise Lord, presides over one good creation 
(as opposed to the subsequent, parallel, bad counter-creations of the evil spirit 
Angra Mainyu, Ahriman); whilst man, made through the Holy Spirit, Spenta 
Mainyu, is the crown of the rest and very good indeed. The Creation story stands 
out in this respect with its possibly Iranian cosmic optimism as incongruous: the 
succeeding sections assembled to patch together this florilegium of Ancient Near 
Eastern mythology accord with the more widespread view of the race succinctly 
stated in the Greek fragment hoi men pleistoi kakoi “most people are bad”. And 
the lost apodosis of this men-de construction suggests a blacker translation, such 
as “not only are most people bad, but furthermore…” When might the Zoroastri-
an concept of the good Creation become current west of the Zagros? The earliest 
time at which Zoroastrian ideas might have entered Israelite thinking would be 
around the time of the rise of the Medes and the eclipse of the Neo-Assyrian 
empire in the mid-late 7th century BC, with the greatest early diffusion of Zoro-
astrian doctrines after the following century — in the Achaemenian period after 
Cyrus the Great (559 BC and later). To return to the question of mishpaṭ, the 
biblical Judges themselves long predated the earliest contacts with Iranians — in 
short, the institution of the judges, the use of the same root for judgment, etc., 



















existed in abundance long before the Book of Genesis was compiled. But the use 
of the root is held back till the colloquy between God and Abraham on the eve of 
the destruction of the Dead Sea metropoleis. 
And this leads one to a curious observation: Abraham’s asseveration that 
God is the Judge of all the world and should therefore really (Rashi) act justly3 
is, as noted above, the first time that the ever-so-common root špṭ, “to judge”, is 
employed in the canonical text of the Hebrew Bible4. That being so, is it really 
the case that there is no judgment or justice? Is one’s isolation of a key word just 
semantic quibbling? The act of judgment itself occurs, to be sure, from the start 
of the Genesis story, and it is arbitrary, tinged with disappointment and exasper-
ation, with dramatically and with increasingly dire effects: after the creation of 
man and woman and their sin, God sentences them to expulsion from Eden and 
to a life of hard labor (though He has presciently created the Sabbath to mitigate 
the consequences of their foreseen Fall). Cain kills his brother Abel and the first 
murderer is condemned by the Lord to wander the earth — though again God 
softens the sentence by promising the terrified Cain protection from arbitrary 
vengeance. Things only get worse, the world is full of violence and chaos (the 
latter, the Rabbis teach, exemplified by the miscegenate production of the exotic 
winged lions and other Mischwesen that colorfully animate Ancient Near Eastern 
art), and God regrets that He has made mankind at all: He brings on the Flood. 
But throughout all, this the word shofet is not used once, is never applied to the 
divinity Whom we now call at the darkest times Dayyan ha-emet, the True Judge 
(and here it’s plain Rashi meant not just actual but fair) we must bless upon 
learning of bereavement (for death is middat ha-din, the existential application 
of the severe side of law). The novelty of Abraham’s words, and their taut, rhetor-
ical sharpness underscore, I think, the idea that the concept of judgment as ad-
umbrated by the first of the three Patriarchs of Israel is something we are meant 
to see as setting a precedent, as not just lexically but qualitatively new. 
It is new in the sense that justice is now perceived, not as the execution of 
a peremptory and one-sided decree, as hitherto, but as an established process 
in which a magistrate arrives at a decision based upon laws that constrain him, 
following the due and orderly presentation of arguments pro et contra to the offi-
cials of a duly appointed court. The parents of humanity departed Eden in abject 
misery and contrition; Cain cried out that his punishment was too much to bear; 
and Noah just followed orders, building his Ark with fixed indifference while 
3 Appealing to the supernatural, Jewish texts assert that judges who act inattentively or even 
corruptly face a Divine sanction themselves that is far worse than any punishment they can mete 
out. The Talmud and subsequent Jewish medieval philosophers, notably Maimonides, address in 
detail and with concern the problem of justice that is slipshod or false, and the ethical standards 
to which judges must strive to adhere: see: Shapira H. For the judgment is God’s… P. 273–328. 
4 Ibid. P. 273 — begins with this very passage from Genesis his long and magisterial survey 
of human and Divine justice in the Hebrew Bible and successive monuments of Jewish law and 
thought. But even he does not take note of the intriguing fact we have stressed, of the concept of 
justice appearing at the end, not the beginning, of the formation of human cultural and social 



















the world went to hell around him. In all these cases there might be protest or 
entreaty after a Divine decree, but it was still a one-way matter: nobody thought 
to argue back, much less hold God to His own rules. Perhaps humanity before 
Abraham had not yet developed to the point at which a system of justice and 
jurisprudence could even be adumbrated — they did not think it because it was 
not yet thinkable. The world before Abraham was no longer an Edenic garden, 
but it did not look like a jungle either. Yet it lived by the oxymoronic “law of the 
jungle”5. There were crafts and fire, metallurgy and music, and cities — but no 
framework of the give and take of human judicial systems that protect the weak 
from the arbitrary will of the strong. Forests, jungles, cities, cavemen with rocks, 
urban armies with bronze spears  — all endured in the same violent chaos of 
arbitrary power. Or, perhaps even worse, there is also the intimation that there 
was a kind of social concord and harmony, but one of uniformity, of conformity, 
without the discourse, the “come let us reason together” of the prophet, that dis-
tinguishes an assembly of human beings from a uniformed horde marching in 
lockstep. The suggestion of such a state of affairs can be inferred from a reading 
of the story of the tower of Babel, before whose (thankfully) abortive erection 
va-yehi kol ha-arets safah aḥat ve-devarim aḥadim, “the whole world was of one 
language and of the same words” (Gen. 11:1). That is, everybody said the same 
thing and nobody thought differently from anybody else. In a modern, atheistic 
totalitarian society in Asia the term for such enforced conformism is “harmony”; 
and the neutralization of a dissident is called “harmonizing”. Thus, Abraham’s 
definition of justice includes the validation of dissident, minority opinions. In 
the portion of the book of Exodus called Mishpaṭim, “Judgments”, God warns the 
Children of Israel, Lo tihyeh aḥarei rabim le-ra‘ot ve-lo ta‘aneh ‘al rov li-nṭot aḥa-
rei rabim le-haṭot “Do not follow the crowd in doing wrong; when you give tes-
timony in a lawsuit, do not pervert justice by siding with the crowd” (Ex. 23:2)6. 
There has never been, before or since, a clearer or more forceful affirmation of 
the legal principle, nay, imperative, of individual freedom of conscience and the 
absolute independence and impartiality of the machinery of justice from the dic-
tatorship of the majority. One might also observe that, once God is recognized 
as Judge, He does not act alone even though He is supreme: He presides over a 
court in which there is both a prosecutor (satan, diabolos) and a defense attorney 
(parakletes) for the accused. Genesis Rabba 51:2 goes so far as to assert that the 
phrase “and God” always connotes “God and His court of law”. It is not only the 
Holy One, Blessed be He, Who is ubiquitous, but His entire tribunal7.
5 The New Yorker magazine once published a cartoon showing bemused people at the edge 
of a thicket contemplating a neatly-printed sign: “You are about to enter the jungle. Please ob-
serve our laws”.
6 Most translations agree on rabbim as “the many, the crowd”, though some prefer “great 
man”, i. e., the powerful. 
7 Cited in the sermon for the Torah portion Be-shalaḥ for 20  January 1940 by the Pias-
eczner Rebbe (Kalonymos Kalmish Shapira R. Sacred Fire: Torah from the Years of Fury 1939–
1942 / transl. by J. Hershy Worch; ed. by Deborah Miller. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 



















Abraham, in the context of the Biblical narrative, not only voices this word, 
justice, that is without precedent in the book, but also employs it in order to de-
fine God in a way nobody has ever done before, and then to presume to constrain 
Him to act according to the proposed definition — to circumscribe, in effect, the 
powers of the Omnipotent. And the Master of the Universe — the divine fisher-
man, He who in the book of Job boasts about how He can catch Leviathan with 
a hook, who in the scornful, vividly imaginative rhetoric of the prophet Ezekiel 
fishes for Pharaoh, that fat crocodile in the Nile, and casts him into the desert 
to rot  — He makes of himself a fish, as it were, and takes the bait! Abraham 
not only wins the point, but also argues Him from a minimum of fifty just men 
down to ten. It is the first plea bargain in the cosmic history of jurisprudence; 
and Abraham is the first of the many illustrious Jewish lawyers to come. But one 
might also observe that Abraham, as he enters into a closer relationship with 
God, discovers in God a feature of justice that nobody before had the wisdom 
or insight to discern. God’s assent can thus be viewed also as approbation and 
recognition of the achievement of His chosen one. Like any proud father taking 
what is called in Yiddish nakhes  — vicarious pleasure  — in His sons besting 
him in Torah learning, God once declares openly Nitsḥuni banai, nitsḥuni banai 
“My children have defeated Me! My children have defeated Me!” (b. Baba Metsia 
59b). This is a known Jewish theme: in the proto-kabbalistic Sefer Yetsirah, when 
Abraham beholds and understands the mysteries displayed before him, God em-
braces him in an affectionate hug. That emotional moment stands out against the 
starkly freezing scenes of cosmogony in the book — the generation of language 
from the spinning of two wheels, an unhuman, non-Euclidean universe in whose 
dimensions good and evil themselves are mere directions like up and down. 
One can pause also to admire the laconism of our father Abraham’s aggres-
sive courtroom style, wit worth of the Temple Bar. He deploys the normal Semit-
ic rhetorical flourish of repetition as a teasing gambit of irony — shofeṭ, mish-
paṭ — to emphasize his point, of a kind that is particularly effective in languages 
that permit one a certain terseness of expression. I would compare Abraham’s 
locution to that, presently to be considered, of Moses in Exodus. In this respect 
Hebrew is much like Russian: Сказать сказал, а прийти не пришел, literally 
“To say he said, but to come he didn’t come”. But one has to expand considerably 
to get the point across in English, arriving at a longer, more unwieldy “His saying 
he was going to come was one thing, but when it came to actually coming, he 
didn’t show”. While standard English needs prolixity, Ebonics employs multiple 
metaphors with shock value to achieve a brevity kindred to that of the effortless 
Hebrew and Russian. The above example might be rendered, then, by the nearly 
proverbial Ebonism “Don’t let your mouth write a check that you’re a — [poste-
rior mulieris] can’t cash”.
The precedent of insisting upon justice, once set, endures; and the ensuing 
rain of poundings of the gavels of mishpaṭ, in heaven and on earth, floods the rest 
of Scripture (Psalm 82, for instance, is devoted in its entirety to the subject). The 
focus of Judaism throughout its history on law is so intense that Christian po-



















or quiddity without faith. This is not the point, of course; the Divine command 
Tsedeq, tsedeq tirdof! “Justice, justice shall you pursue!” better captures the spirit 
and imperative of Torah. Moses, who stutters in embarrassment when address-
ing Pharaoh or the Children of Israel, uses every brazen rhetorical trick imagi-
nable to argue eyeball to eyeball with God. At the end of the first weekly portion 
of Exodus, Moses chides, cajoles, and provokes: Since You sent me, things have 
only gotten worse! As far as saving is concerned, You have not saved Your peo-
ple! (Ve-hatsel lo hitsalta et ‘amekha: cf. the discussion of rhetorical repetitive 
irony, supra.) And God replies as the parashah ends with a thrilling cliffhanger 
(next Shabbat the cowboy rescues the kidnapped heroine from the horse-steal-
ing varmints). If one may paraphrase in American — Oh yeah? Well now I’ll 
show you what I’m gonna do! And there ensue precisely ten plagues, culminating 
with proper irony in the slaying of the Egyptian first-born even as Moses had 
been rescued from the decreed massacre of the first-born boy children of Israel 
(cliffhanger again Will she see the basket in the Nile and then be able to pluck it 
from the Nile? She does! A save!). Abraham and Moses are also parallel in that 
they seldom argue on their own behalf, only for their clients, as it were. When 
commanded to sacrifice Isaac, Abraham obeys without question. Indeed, in a 
long, shocking, and amply-documented midrashic tradition that goes against the 
peshaṭ, the literal text, Abraham in an excess of obedience ignores the angel’s 
command to stay his hand, plunges the knife into Isaac’s breast and then burns 
the blood-besmeared corpse to a crisp; God’s revivifying dew resurrects “your 
son, your only son, whom you love, Isaac” from the ashes8. Early in Deuteron-
omy, Moses relates to the Children of Israel how he pleaded (ve-etḥanan) to be 
allowed to enter the Land of Israel, only for God to tell him: No, and don’t bring 
it up again, either! And after this most crushing of refusals, he does not.
But in arguing on others’ behalf, the prophets of Israel were fearless, how-
ever diffident they may have been in speaking up for themselves, and that rep-
utation carried into the developed mythology of a later, kindred faith. The early 
medieval Mi‘raj-nameh, a Dantesque narrative avant la lettre of the journey of 
the Prophet Muḥammad, peace be upon him, to heaven and hell, conflates in 
its presentation of Moses the role of the advocate and guide through the desert 
with the lawyerly quiddity of the personality of Abraham. Muḥammad, having 
ascended on the back of the miraculous steed Buraq beyond the seven heavens, 
approaches the Divine Throne. Angels play harps and sing. Then the Lord gets 
down to brass tacks and tells His Messenger that Muslims are to pray fifty times 
a day. Fortunately the Prophet has brought his counsel to what he must have 
known was to be an important business meeting: he consults Moses and the 
latter advises him to bargain Allah down to five. The two come away with suc-
cess from the negotiations, with the promise of the bonus that those five (now 
the standard number, a borrowing from Zoroastrian practice) will be rewarded 



















as though they were the original fifty — a good day in the Divine court!9 And 
of course in ages to come Israel continued to approach the issue of theodicy, in 
new ironic hues that might have left the Patriarchs aghast in reverential horror 
(but inwardly smirking in admiration of a fellow shyster.) Thus we encounter the 
famous anecdote in the Gemara (b. Baba Metsia 59b: God’s admiring close of 
the passage is cited above) about Rabbis who reject the helpful offer of a Divine 
opinion on a case, because hi lo ba-shamayim “it [the Torah] is not in Heaven” 
(Deuteronomy 30:12). Among the many spin-offs in Jewish humor of the sugya 
is one about a dispute between three old rabbis and one young one. The latter 
enlists a vote in his favor by the Master of the Universe, to which the elders, un-
moved, reply “So? It was three to one, now it’s three to two”. The Hasidic master 
R. Levi Yitzḥak of Berdichev (1740–1810) famously indicted God for allowing 
the Jewish exile to continue, and convicted Him  — even though the accused 
failed to appear in court to defend Himself. The ancient polity that Eric Nelson 
has called “The Hebrew Republic” appears to enshrine a principle that is one of 
the pillars of jurisprudence in an authentic democracy — that no one, including 
the One, is above the law. (The other, which thanks to the ideology of the an-
ti-democratic “liberal” establishment, no longer exists in the United States, was 
the presumption of innocence.)
We have seen that in the chronology of Genesis the patriarch Abraham in-
vented, discovered, and discerned the principle of justice, embodying fair pro-
cedure, only after the first stages of human cultural development had happened: 
the expulsion from Eden and the covering of the nakedness of the first human 
couple; agriculture and shepherding, and the first murder; the invention of crafts 
and metalwork; and urbanization. This is not the intuitive order to which the 
usual concept of social evolution might accustom one: man is Aristotle’s logikon 
politikon zōon, “a rational animal who lives in cities”, and surely the idea of justice 
must be a component of the logos of a city for it to be so called — a Greek polis. 
But there is a Greek myth that does correspond to the seemingly counter-intu-
itive order of Genesis, and that may have a connection to the Semitic-speaking 
world with which the Hellenes were associated intimately and ab initio.
Plato in the Protagoras 320c–323a introduces the Sophist after whom the 
Socratic dialogue is named, whose claim to be demolished in due course by 
Socrates is that he (and others of his profession) can teach others the virtues of 
wisdom, temperance, justice, holiness, and courage; Socrates gradually reduces 
this to the teaching of the single category of knowledge. Protagoras adorns his 
presentation with a myth, much as others, including Socrates, are wont to do. 
This is as much a mnemonic device as a component of argument, much in the 
way that in the Gemara aggadah, story-telling, accompanies halakhah, straight-
forward, detailed law. It is easier to remember a story, with its helpful armature of 
characters with familiar characters and roles and the linked stages in the progress 
of an archetypal narrative line, than it is to recall an abstract rational argument 
9 See: Séguy M.-R. The Miraculous Journey of Mahomet (Mirâj Na ̂meh). New York: 



















with its legal quiddities. In the Platonic corpus, as in Greek mythology generally, 
these Hellenized myth-narratives can be of Near Eastern origin. In the Sympo-
sium, for instance, the comic playwright Aristophanes in his rather humorous 
after-dinner speech bases his definition of love on a cosmological myth that is 
in most respects identical to that laid out in the Zoroastrian book of creation, 
the Bundahishn (“Creation”) or Zand-agahih (“Knowledge of the Avesta Com-
mentary”), a Pahlavi text dating to the ninth century AD that forms, however, 
the translation and commentary upon a much earlier scripture in Avestan that 
is now lost. It is a very serious myth, even though Aristophanes, as a supporter 
of Athenian democracy and potent enemy of Socrates’ aristocratic, reactionary 
faction, is tendentiously presented as an entertaining intellectual lightweight. 
According to Protagoras, then, the early gods molded the creatures under the 
earth, and then commanded Prometheus and his brother Epimetheus to dis-
tribute powers to them. Epimetheus, whose name means “Afterthought”, used 
up his gifts on the animals before getting around to men, who were left naked 
and defenseless. Prometheus, “Forethought”, stole tekhnē  — the various skills 
and crafts — and fire, neither of which the other animals had received, from the 
gods Hephaistos and Athena. But mankind, although warmly clothed, housed in 
cities, equipped with a full array of metal tools and weapons, and so on, still had 
no dikē, “justice” or aidōs “fear, reverence”. Zeus sent these to humanity through 
his messenger Hermes; but Prometheus was punished for theft10. The punish-
ment, abundantly depicted in ancient art, seems to foreshadow the Crucifixion. 
Prometheus, the god who had sought to benefit man, is splayed naked on a rocky 
peak of the high Caucasus and suffers in agony as an eagle daily eats his resur-
rected, reconstituted liver. Aeschylus’ cycle dramatized for Athenians, for whom 
the nature of justice and the profession of the Sophists were lively issues, the 
passion of the very human god. And in the early Christian centuries, as one 
scholar has observed, Prometheus “plays the role of a sort of ‘Genesis secundum 
Gentiles’” and late antique Christian Bible illumination may bear the influence 
10 See the old compilation and study by J. A. Stewart (Stewart J. A. The Myths of Plato, re-
print. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1960), still extremely useful, for a dis-
cussion of this myth and the others scattered through Plato. In Prometheus Bound the god con-
ceals his stolen fire by filling a fennel stalk with it (narthēkoplērōton): this detail clearly refracts an 
Indo-European topos, for in the pre-Christian Armenian cosmogonic Song of Vahagn (Avestan 
Verethraghna, Commagenian Artagnēs-Heraklēs) the fire-god emerges from a reed (Armenian 
ełegn, a word that has been adduced by some as the origin of the elegy), see: Russell J. R. “Car-
mina Vahagni” // Acta Antiqua. Vol. 32. Budapest, 1989. Fasc. 3–4. — If one regards the song 
as Promethean in intent, and thus peculiarly concerned with compassion for humanity, then it 
may add to our understanding of the way that Vahagn seems to have assumed in the Armenian 
Zoroastrian pantheon of the Arsacid period the place in the supreme triad as we know it from the 
inscriptions of the Achaemenids in Old Persian that was reserved for Mithra, the most human 
of the yazatas and the embodiment, relevantly, of justice: Arm. Aramazd, Anahit, Vahagn, vs. 
OP. Ahura Mazda, Anahita, Mithra. Old Persian dāta, “law” (New Persian dādestān), is borrowed 



















of Promethean iconography11. The classicist and psychologist C. Kerényi has ob-
served also that when Prometheus cries adika paskhō, “I suffer unjustly!” the 
god’s protest in Prometheus Bound is (in Greece at least) “the first denunciation 
of injustice before a court”12. The author further argues that it is only with Pro-
metheus’ gifts of skills beyond the instincts that men are fully realized as human, 
but by virtue of that very realization they encounter the predicament of suffering 
universal to living beings with a sense of injustice that is particular to us, and of 
which other animals are free13.
The late arrival of justice on the scene in the cosmological myth propounded 
by Protagoras makes sense in the context of Periclean Athens in a way it never 
could at any stage of Jewish history. For Jewish cultural values do not embrace the 
idea of a city, beyond the sacredness of Jerusalem — and sacredness is not a de-
finably urban characteristic. For the Hellenes, particularly those of the charmed 
time and space of Socrates, the polis, with its institutions, is not just the ultimate 
expression of human culture, it is the only way of life in which a man can be-
come fully realized in his identity and potential. Laws and the administration 
of justice are the foundation of the Greek city, not an additional structure. The 
Oresteia trilogy of Aeschylus ends with a jury trial at Athens in which the city’s 
tutelary goddess, acting as Shekhinah, casts her vote to break the tie and acquit 
Orestes, with a court award to the Erinyes, the Furies of his murdered mother. 
In like manner, Euripides introduces Athens as a place of clemency and sanctu-
ary for Oedipus from the new tyrant of Thebes. In both cases, we encounter the 
Athenian founding myth, and isonomia, equality under law, is at its very core. 
The introduction of justice only after creation and acculturation, technology and 
urbanization, makes sense if one is building towards a teleological statement of 
the superiority of the Greek city state, as opposed to the barbarian city. That or-
der works otherwise, I should say less strongly, if the direction of the argument 
is towards Jerusalem, not Athens. The Sophists trained lawyers and the myth of 
Protagoras flatters the profession; but for Israel the reflex of the same myth in 
Genesis works differently, tending towards a concept of human justice irrespec-
tive of the urban aspect, based upon Divine law, with the presence of the Divine 
in legal proceedings — not to mention His participation in them — posing an 
enduring metaphysical problem. (It does not, for the Greeks: Athena’s ballot was 
unique, and I do not believe she has reported for jury duty since the fall of the 
House of Argos.) 
As to a possible Semitic genetic source of the myth, beyond the thematic 
parallels, one notes that Prometheus and his short-sighted brother (whose poor 
judgment is reflected also in his taking to wife the first woman, Pandora14) are 
the sons of the titan Iapetos, an elder brother of Kronos — that is, in the genera-
11 See: Raggio O. The Myth of Prometheus // Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Insti-
tutes. 1958. Vol. 21, no. 1–2. P. 47–48.
12 Kerényi C. Prometheus: Archetypal Image of Human Existence. London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1963. P. 83, 87.
13 Ibid. P. 88–89.



















tion of divinities preceding the Olympian gods. Ion, the first Ionian, is a remote 
descendant of Iapetos and Prometheus, and Iapetos is also the grandfather of 
Deukalion, the human survivor of the Greek version of the myth of the Deluge. 
All this provides fair circumstantial evidence, beyond homonymic similarity, for 
the identification of Iapetos with the Biblical son of Noah Yāfet, Japheth, who 
helps to repopulate the world after the Flood with his brood of Indo-Europeans, 
amongst whom is Yavan (=Ion, and the Greeks in general)15. That is, the myth 
about the stages of culture and the introduction of Justice told by Sophist Protag-
oras may have shared a common origin, perhaps in a Semitic language, with the 
narrative in Genesis. At least this is possible if I am right in my argument that 
there is strong thematic significance to the late entry of the word for justice into 
the structured narrative of Genesis. And once more, the answer to Tertullian’s 
question, What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? is, Everything16.
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Судия всей земли поступит ли неправосудно? Заметки о книге Бытия, 
Протагоре и справедливости Божьей 
Дж. Р. Рассел
Калифорнийский государственный университет (Фресно), 
5241 N Maple Ave, Фресно, Калифорния, 93740, США
Для цитирования: Russell J. R. “Will the judge of all the earth not do justice?” A note 
on Genesis, Protagoras, and theodicy // Вопросы теологии. 2020. Т. 2, № 1. С. 106–117. 
http://doi.org/10.21638/spbu28.2020.107
Древнееврейские слова шофет (судья) и  мишпат (правосудие, справедли-
вость), употребляются впервые в  книге Бытия лишь на позднем этапе тех-
нического и  общественного развития человечества, когда уже существуют 
ремесла и города и после того, как Господь уже судил и отдельных людей (на-
пример, первого убийцу, Каина), и живущий мир в целом (в эпизоде Потопа). 
Патриарх Авраам называет Бога судьей всей земли, как будто Ему навязывая 
это звание и, соответственно, ограничивая Божий произвол. Автор статьи 
полагает, что этот порядок событий в тексте неслучаен, он указывает на но-
вую концепцию справедливости, опирающуюся на равноправие перед зако-
ном и процедуру изложения аргументов перед судьей (и судом). Поскольку 
Господь безоговорочно принимает такое самоопределение, есть основание 
полгать, что умственный и  духовный характер человечества, олицетворен-
ного Авраамом, развился до такой степени, что человек наконец сумел уло-
вить эти доселе неизвестные Господние черты. Далее в  статье выдвигается 
предположение, что библейская тема божественной справедливости близка 
к мифу о Прометее, Эпиметее и Зевсе, излагаемому в «Протагоре» Платона, 
у которых, быть может, общие, семитские корни, поскольку Прометей и его 
несчастный брат  — потомки титана Иапета. Последний, вероятно, тожде-
ствен с библейским Иафетом. 
Ключевые слова: Авраам, Моисей, шофет, мишпат, справедливость Божья, 
Марина Цветаева, зороастризм, ми’радж, хасидский Бердичевский раввин, 
Платон, Протагор, Афины.
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